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Executive Summary
Why did commercialization of the Internetgo so well? This paper examines
events in the Internet access market as a window on this broadquestion. The
study emphasizes four themes. First, commercializing Internetaccess did not
give rise to many of the anticipated technical and operational challenges.En-
trepreneurs quickly learned that the Internet access businesswas commercially
feasible. Second, Internet access was malleableas a technology and as an eco-
nomic unit. Third, privatization fostered attempts to adapt thetechnology in
new uses, new locations, new market settings, new applications and incon-
junction with other lines of business. These went beyond whatanyone would
have forecast by examining the uses for the technology priorto 1992. Fourth,
and not trivially, the NSF was lucky in one specificsense. The Internet access
industry commercialized at a propitious moment,at the same time as the
growth of an enormous new technological opportunity the WorldWide Web.
As it turned out, the web thrived under market oriented, decentralized,and in-
dependent decision making. The paper draws lessons forpolicies governing
the commercialization of other government managed technologiesand for the
Internet access market moving forward.
I.Motivation
The "commercialization of the Internet" is shorthand forthree nearly
simultaneous events: the removal of restrictions by the NationalSci-
ence Foundation (NSF) over use of the Internet for commercialpur-
poses, the browser wars initiated by the founding of Netscape, and the
rapid entry of tens of thousands of firms intocommercial ventures us-
ing technologies which employ the suite of TCP/IPstandards. These
events culminated years of work at NSF to transfer the Internetinto
commercial hands from its exclusive use for research activityin gov-
ernment funded laboratories and universities.Greenstein 152
Sufficient time has passed to begin to evaluatehow the market per-
formed after commercialization. Such an evaluationis worth doing.
Actual events have surpassed the forecasts of the mostoptimistic man-
agers at NSF. Was this due to meregood fortune or something system-
atic whose lessons illuminate themarket today? Other government
managed technologies usually face vexingtechnical and commercial
challenges that prevent the technology fromdiffusing quickly, if at all.
Can we draw lessons from this episode forthe commercialization of
other government managed technologies?
In that spirit, this paper examines the Internet accessmarket and one
set of actors, Internet Service Providers(ISPs). ISPs provide Internet ac-
cess for most of thehouseholds and business users in the country
(NTIA 1999), usually for a fee or, more recently, inexchange for adver-
tising. Depending on the user facilities,whether it is a business or a
personal residence, access can involve dial-up to alocal number or
1-800 number at different speeds, or direct accessto the user's server
employing one of several high speed accesstechnologies. The largest
ISP in the United States today is America-On-Line,to which approxi-
mately half the households in the U.S. subscribe.There also are many
national ISPs with recognizable names, such asAT&T Worldnet, MCI
WorldCom/UUNet, Mindspring/Earthlink, andPSINet, as well as
thousands of smaller regional ISPs.
The Internet access market is a good case toexamine. Facilities for
similar activity existed prior to commercialization,but there was rea-
son to expect a problematicmigration into commercial use. This activ-
ity appeared to possess idiosyncratictechnical features and un-
economic operational procedures which made itunsuitable in other
settings. The Internet's exclusive use byacademics and researchers fos-
tered cautious predictions that unanticipatedproblems would abound
and commercial demand might not materialize
In sharp contrast to cautious expectations,however, the ISP market
displayed three extraordinary features. For one, thismarket grew rap-
idly, attracting thousands of entrants and many users,quickly achiev-
ing mass-market status. Second, firmsoffering this service became
nearly geographically pervasive, a diffusion patternrarely found in new
infrastructure markets. And third, firmsdid not settle on a standard
menu of services to offer,indicative of new commercial opportunities
and also a lack of consensus about the optimalbusiness model for this
opportunity. Aside from defying expectations,all three traitsrapid
growth, geographic pervasiveness, and the absenceof settlementdo
not inherently go together in most markets.The presence of restructur-Commercialization of the Internet 153
ing should have interfered with rapid growth and geographic expan-
sion. So explaining this market experience is also interesting in its own
right.
What happened to make commercialization go so well? This paper's
examination reveals four themes. First, commercialization did not give
rise to many of the anticipated technical and operational challenges.
Entrepreneurs quickly learned that the Internet access business was
commercially feasible. This happened for a variety of economic rea-
sons. ISPs began offering commercial service after making only incre-
mental changes to familiar operating procedures borrowed from the
academic setting. It was technically easy to collect revenue at what
used to be the gateway functions of academic modem pools. Moreover,
the academic model of Internet access migrated into commercial opera-
tion without any additional new equipment suppliers.
Second, Internet access was malleable as a technology and as aneco-
nomic unit. This is because the foundation for Internetinter-
connectivity, TCP/IP, is not a single invention, diffusing across time
and space without changing form. Instead, it is embedded in equip-
ment that uses a suite of communication technologies, protocols, and
standards for networking between computers. This technology obtains
economic value in combination with complementary invention, invest-
ment, and equipment. While commercialization did give rise to re-
structuringofInternetaccesstosuitcommercialusers,the
restructuring did not stand in the way of diffusion, nor interfere with
the initial growth of demand.
Third, privatizing Internet access fostered customizing Internet ac-
cess technology to a wide variety of locations, circumstances, and us-
ers. As it turned out, the predominant business model was feasible at
small scale and, thus, at low levels of demand. This meant that the
technology was commercially viable at low densities of population,
whether or not it was part of a national branded service or a local geo-
graphically concentrated service. Thus, privatization transferred the
operation of the technology to a new set of decision makers who
had new ideas about what could be done with it. Since experimenta-
tion was not costly, this enabled attempts to adapt the technology
in new uses, new locations, new market settings, new applications,
and in conjunction with other lines of business. While many of these
attempts failed, a large number of them also succeeded. These suc-
cesses went well beyond what anyone would have forecast by examin-
ing the limited uses for the technology by noncommercial users prior
to 1992.154 Greenstein
Fourth, and not trivially, the NSF was lucky in a particular sense of
the word. It enabled the commercialization of the Internet access indus-
try at a propitious moment, at the same time as the growth of an enor-
mous new technological opportunity, theWorld Wide Web. This
invention motivated further experimentation to take advantage of the
new opportunity, that, as it turned out, thrivedunder market oriented
and decentralized decision making.
The paper first develops these themes. Then it describes recent expe-
rience. It ends by discussing how these themes continue to resonate
today.
II.Challenges During Technology Transfer: An Overview
Conventional approaches to technological development led most ob-
servers in 1992 to be cautious about thecommercialization of the
Internet. To understand how this prediction went awry it is important
to understand its foundations.
Many studies of the commercialization of technology emphasize the
situated nature of technological development. Technologies do not
simply spring out of the ether; instead, learning processes and adapta-
tion behavior shape them. Users and suppliers routinely tailor technol-
ogies to short term needs, making decisions that reflect temporary
price schedules or idiosyncratic preferences, resulting in technological
outcomes that can only be understood in terms of these unique circum-
stances and origins.1 Such themes resonate throughout studies oftech-
nologies which develop under government management.2
Seen through this light, the most problematic feature of the Internet
was its long exclusive use by military, government, oracademic users.
Prior to 1992 it had developed into the operations found at an academic
modem pool or research center. These were small scale operations, typ-
ically serving no more than several hundred users, involving a mix of
frontier and routine hardware and software. A small operation re-
quired a server to monitor traffic and act as a gatekeeper, a router to di-
recttraffic between the Internet and users at PCs within a
local-area-network (LAN) or calling center, and a connection to the
Internet backbone or data exchange point operated by the NSF. These
were often run by a small staff, either students orinformation technol-
ogy professionals.
Revenues were not regularly collected in these arrangements and
budgetary constraints were not representative of what might arise withCommercialization of the Internet 155
commercial operations and competitivepressures. Many small colleges
had opened their Internet connections with NSF subsidies.The organi-
zational arrangement within research computingcenters also was idio-
syncratic, usually with only loose ties, if any, to the professionallyrun
administrative computing centers ofa university or research organiza-
tion. The array of services matched the needs of academicor research
computing, which had only a partial overlap with the needsof com-
mercial users.
Any student of technology transfer would have confidentlypre-
dicted that the transition into commercial markets wouldgive rise to
challenges. Standing in 1992 and looking forward,it was uncertain
whether these challenges would takea long time to solve and whether
commercial users' needs would be difficult to address. Ingeneral, con-
ventional analysis anticipates one of three challenges: technical,commer-
cial, and structural challenges.
Technical challenges often arise during commercialization.Govern-
ment users, government procurement, andgovernment subsidies re-
sult in technology with many features mismatchedto commercial
needs. Products possessed features for which vendorsor users have no
need. Alternatively, commercial vendors andusers do need other fea-
tures. Thus, as a technical or engineering matter,a technology which is
mature for exclusive noncommercial usessuchas a military applica-
tionmay appear primitive in civilianuse. It may require complemen-
tary inventions to become commercially viable. If theserequirements
are considerable, then commercialization may occur slowly.
For example, military users frequently require electroniccompo-
nents to meet specifications that suit the component to battlecondi-
tions. Extensive technical progress is needed to tailora product design
to meet these requirements. Yet, and this is difficult toanticipate prior
to commercialization, an additional amount of invention is oftenneeded
to bring its manufacturing to a price/point with features thatmeet
morecost-consciousorlesstechnicallystringentcommercial
requirements.
Commercial challenges arise when commercial markets requiresub-
stantial adaptation of operation and businessprocesses in order to put
technologies into use. In other words, governmentusers or users in a
research environment often tolerate operationalprocesses that do not
translate profitably to commercial environments. Aftera technology
transfers out of government sponsorship, itmay not be clear how to
balance costs and revenues for technologies that had developedunderGreenstein 156
settings with substantial subsidies underwritinglosses, and research
goals justifying expenditures. Hence, manygovernment managed
technologies require considerable experimentationwith business mod-
els before they begin to grow, if they grow atall.
For example, the supersonic transportactually met its engineering
targets, but still failed to satisfy basicoperational economics in most
settings. Being technically sleek wasinsufficient to attract enough in-
terest to generate the revenue to coveroperating costs on any but a
small set of routes. No amount of operationalinnovations and market-
ing campaigns were able to overcome thesecommercial problems.
New technologies are also vulnerable tostructural challenges that im-
pede pathways to commercialization.Commercial and structural chal-
lenges are not necessarily distinct, though thelatter are typically more
complex. Structural challenges are those that requirechange to the
bundle of services offered, change to the boundaryof the firms offering
or using the new technology, ordramatic change to the operational
structure of the service organization. Thesechallenges arise because
technologies developed under government auspices may presumeim-
plementation at a particular scale or with a set oftechnical standards,
but require a different set of organizationalarrangements to support
commercial applications.
For example, while many organizationsprovided the technical ad-
vances necessary for scientificcomputing in academic settings during
the 1950s, very few of these same firmsmigrated into supporting large
customer bases among business users.As it turned out, the required
changes were too dramatic for many companies tomake. The structure
of the support and sales organization were verydifferent, and so too
were the product designs. Of course,the few who successfully made
the transition to commercial users, such as IBM,did quite well, but do-
ing so required overcoming considerableobstacles.
In summary, conventional analysis forecaststhat migrating Internet
access into commercial usewould engender technical, commercial, and
structural challenges. Why did the migrationproceed so different from
what was expected?
III.The Absence of Challenge in the InternetAccess Industry
An ISP is a commercial firm that provides access,maintains it for a fee,
and develops related applications as usersrequire. While sometimes
this is all they do, with business users theyoften do much more. Some-
times ISPs do simple things such as filtering.Sometimes it involvesCommercialization of the Internet 157
managing and designing e-mail accounts, databases,and web pages.
Some ISPs label this activity consultingand charge for it separately;
others do not consider it distinct from thenormal operation of the
Internet access services.
On the surface the record of achievement forISPs is quite remark-
able. Most recent surveys show thatno more than 10% of U.S. house-
holds get their Internetaccess from university sponsored Internet
access providers, the predominant provider of suchaccess prior to
commercialization. Today almost allusers go to a commercial provider
(Clemente 1998, Nie and Ebring 2000). As of 1997,this ISP industry was
somewhere between a three and five billion dollarindustry (Maloff
1997), and it is projected to be much larger ina few years.
By the end of the century the ISP markethad obtained a remarkable
structure. One firm, America On-Line, providedaccess to close to half
the households in the U.S. market, whileseveral score of other ISPs
provided access to millions of households andbusinesses on a nation-
wide basis. Thousands of ISPs also providedaccess for limited geo-
graphic areas, such as one city or region. Suchsmall ISPs accounted for
roughly a quarter of householduse and another fraction of business
use.
Technical Challenges Did Not Get in the Way
The Internet access market did suffer fromsome technical challenges,
but not enough to prevent rapid diffusion.Commercialization induced
considerable technical innovation in complementaryinventive activi-
ties. Much of this innovative activity becameassociated with develop-
ing new applications for existingusers and new users.
It is often forgotten that when the electroniccommerce first devel-
oped based on TCP/IP standards, itwas relatively mature in some ap-
plications, such as e-mail and file transfers,which were the most
popular applications (theseprograms continue to be the most popular
today, NTIA 1999). To besure, TCP/IP based programs were weak in
other areas, such as commercial databaseand software applications for
business use, but those uses did not necessarilyhave to come immedi-
ately. The invention of the World Wide Web in theearly 1990s further
stretched the possibilities for potential applicationsand highlighted
these weaknesses.
More important for the initial diffusion, littletechnical invention was
required for commercial vendors toput this technology into initial
mainstream use. Academic modem pools andcomputing centers158
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tended to use technologies similar totheir civilian counterpartssuch
as bulletin boardoperatorswhile buying most equipment from com-
mercial suppliers. Moving this activity intothe mainstream commer-
cial sector did not necessitatebuilding a whole new Internet
equipment industry; it was alreadythere, supplying goods and ser-
vices to the universities and tohome PC users. Similarly, much of the
software continued to be usefulthat is,Unix systems, the gate-
keeping software, and the basiccommunication protocols. Indeed,
every version of Unixsoftware had been TPC/IP compatiblefor many
years due to Departmentof Defense requirements. A simple commer-
cial operation only needed toadd a billing component to the
gatekeeping software to turn an academicmodem pool into a rudimen-
tary commercial operation.
Technical information about these operations was easyto obtain if
one had sufficienttechnical background; a BA in basicelectrical engi-
neering or computer science was far morethan adequate. Many ISP en-
trepreneurs had used the technology asstudents or in related lines of
business. Descriptions of some of theearliest access operations show
that they did not employ any exotichardware or rare technologies
(Kalakota and Whinston 1996, Koistad1998). Many Internet bulletin
boards quickly developed andBoardwatch Magazine, among others,
expanded its focus from bulletin boards toISP as early as 1994, also
spreading information about how to operatesuch ventures. Several
vendor associations, such as theCommercial Internet Exchange, were
formed and also served as information sources.
Users with investments in networkingtechnology, such as LANs or
simple client/server architectures, alsocould adopt basic features with
little further invention. Internettechnologies associated with textual in-
formation had incubated for 20 yearsand were well past the necessary
degree of technical maturity necessaryfor mainstream use. Telnet, FTP,
and the basic protocols for e-mail werewidely diffused and relatively
easy to use. Some communicationsoftware already used TCP/IP and
many of the common programscould easily adapt to it. There were al-
ready many similar technical activitiestaking place in commercial set-
tings. TCP/IP compatibility wasbuilt into Windows 95, which further
eased investments for users after 1995.
The basic commercial transactionfor Internet access also did not
raise prohibitive technical issues.Most often it involved repetitious
and ongoing transactions betweenvendor and user. A singular transac-
tion arose when the vendorperformed one activity, setting up InternetCommercialization of the Internet 159
access or attaching Internet access to an existing computing network. If
the ISP also operated the access for theuser, then this ongoing opera-
tion provided frequent contact between theuser and vendor, and it
provided frequent opportunity for the vendorto change the delivery of
services in response to changes in technology and changesin user
needs. This worked well because inmany cases an ISP was better edu-
cated about the technological capabilities than theuser. In effect, the
ISP sold that general knowledge to theuser in some form that custom-
ized it to the particular needs and requirements of theuser. At its sim-
plest level, this provided users with their firstexposure to a new
technological possibility while educating them about itspotential.
Often access went beyond exposure to the Internet,especially with a
business user, and included the installation, maintenance, andtraining,
as well as application development. These types of transfers of knowl-
edge typically involved a great deal ofnuance, often escaped attention,
and yet were essential to developing infrastructuremarkets as an on-
going and valuable economic activity. The basic technicalknow-how
did not differ greatly from routine knowledge found in thecomputing
services sector prior to commercialization.
Finally, some NSF decisions and legacy regulatory decisionsalso
aided. When the NSF tookover stewardship of the Internet backbone,
it invested in developing a scalable system of addresstables and IP-ad-
dress systems. Subsequent growth tested those investmentsand inven-
tions; no surprising problems were found,nor did any engineering
problems hinder growth. Domain name registration alsoremained a
gentle monopoly until recently. Data exchange points remainedorga-
nized around the cooperative engineering principles usedwithin the
NSF days. A competitive data communicationsindustry was begin-
ning to reach adolescence at about thesame time as commercialization
and provided additional access points fornew firms, particularly in ur-
ban areas. So as a technical matter, interconnection withthe public
switch network did not pose any significant engineeringchallenges
(Werbach 1997).
Commercial Challenges Did Not Slow Diffusion
Internet access was built in an extremely decentralized marketenviron-
ment. Aside from the loosely coordinateduse of a few de facto stan-
dards (such as the World Wide Web consortium)government
mandates after commercializationwere fairly minimal. ISPs had littleGreenstein 160
guidance or restrictions. They were thereforeable to tailor their offer-
ings to local market conditions and tofollow entrepreneurial hunches
about growing demand.
As a technical matter, there were few barriers toentry in the provi-
sion of dial-up access. As a result,commercial factors, and not the dis-
tribution of technical knowledge amongproviders, largely determined
the patterns of development of the basic dial-up accessmarket immedi-
ately after commercialization. To the surpriseof many, the operational
procedures developed over two decades lentthemselves to the early
commercial implementations, fostering a foundationfor commercial
growth. As with many new markets which spawnin noncommercial
environments (Ventresca et al. 1998), manyfeatures were borrowed
wholesale and without question. In effect, entrepreneursborrowed the
organization of the academic modem pool andtried to put a revenue
generating function on top of it. Billing software wasadded to the basic
gateway component, and once thisproved to be a feasible way to col-
lect revenue, many entrepreneurs built on topof that commercial form.
Shortly after commercialization in 1994,only a few commercial en-
terprises offered national dial-up networkswith Internet access, mostly
targeting the major urban areas. Pricing was notstandardized and var-
ied widely (Boardwatch 1994-1995). Most ofthese ISPs were devoted
to recreating the type of networkfound in academic settings or modify-
ing a commercial bulletin board with theaddition of backbone connec-
tions, so interconnection among these firmsdid not raise insoluble
contracting or governance problems. TheseISPs were devoted primar-
ily to dial-up; few ISPs attemptedsophisticated data transport over
higher speed lines, where the regulatory issuescould be more complex
and where local exchange competitors weredeveloping the nascent
market.
Very quickly ISPs learned that low cost deliveryrequired locating ac-
cess facilities close to customers.This had to do with telephony pricing
policies across the U.S. The U.S. telephone systemhas one pervasive
feature; distance-sensitive pricing at the locallevel. In virtually every
part of the country, phone calls oversignificant distances (i.e., more
than 30 miles) engender per minute expenses, butlocal calls are usually
free. Hence, Internet access providers had a stronginterest in reducing
expenses to users by providinglocal coverage. Unmet local demand
was a commercial opportunityfor an entrepreneurial ISP.
As it turned out, access over dial-up lentitself to small scale commer-
cial implementations. Several hundred customerscould generateCommercialization of the Internet 161
enough revenue to support physical facilities anda high-speed back-
bone connection in one location,so scale economies were not very
binding. The marginal costs of providing dial-upservices were low
and the marginal costs of expansion also fell quickly,as remote moni-
toring technology made it cheap toopen remote facilities. The marginal
costs to users of dial-up service were also low inresponse, involving
only incremental changes for organizations that hadexperience with
PC use or LAN technology. It waseasy to generate revenue in subscrip-
tion models, where a commercial firm withheld availabilityof access
unless payment was made. Hence, the economic thresholdsfor com-
mercial dial-up service turned out to be feasibleon a very small scale,
encouraging small firms and independent ISPs. To besure, many firms
also tried to implement access businesseson a large scale, but the eco-
nomic advantage of large scale did not preclude theentry of small scale
firms, at least not at first.
Finally, decades of debate in telephony had alreadyclarified many
regulatory rules for interconnection with the publicswitch network,
eliminating some potential local delays in implementingthis technol-
ogy on a small scale. The FCC treated ISPs as an enhanced service,not
passing on access charges to themas if they were competitive tele-
phone companies, effectively making it cheaper andadministratively
easier to be an ISP. This decision did not receive muchnotice at the time
since most insiders did not anticipate theextent of the growth that
would arise. As ISPs have grown andas they threaten to become com-
petitive voice carriers, these interconnection regulationshave come un-
der more scrutiny (Sidek and Spulber 1998, Weinberg1999).
In retrospect, two key events of 1995 set thestage for the commercial
ISP market for the remainder of the decade. The firstwas the Netscape
IPO in August 1995. The other was the entry of AT&TWorld Net.
The World Wide Web was known in the academiccommunity in the
early I 990s. It began to diffuse prior tocommercialization and acceler-
ated with Mosaic, a prototype browser developedat the University of
Illinois. Many ISPs included Mosaicon their systems. Despite licensing
the technology to many firms, the University of Illinoisdid not gener-
ate as much excitement as the Netscape IPO, which broughtextensive
publicity to the new technology (Cusumano and Yoffie1998). The sub-
sequent browser wars further heightened thisawareness.
The emergence of the web changed thecommercial opportunities for
ISPs. ISPs found themselves both providinga traditional service in de-
mand, text-based applications suchas e-mail, and trying to positionGreenstein 162
themselves for a new service, web applications.This new opportunity
provided strong incentives to grow and experimentwith new business
models and new lines of service. It alsoinduced considerable new en-
try. While not all marketsexperienced the same type of competitive
choices, nor did all ISPs see the sameopportunities, many private firms
found ways to develop opportunities quickly,learning lessons that
they then applied in other localities.
AT&T's entry was also important but its actionsmattered because of
what did not happen rather than what did.AT&T developed a nation-
wide Internet access service, which wasavailable in much of the coun-
try, opening with as large ageographic spread as any other
contemporary national provider. It also grewquickly, acquiring one
million customers with heavy publicity andmarketing. This growth
depended on the strength of its promise to bereliable, competitively
priced, and easy to use. It was deliberatelyaimed at households, and
provided a mass-market service from a name brand.It was a commer-
cial success, to be sure, but that was all. It was not ahuge or dominant
success, nor did it initiate ashakeout or restructuring of the market for
ISP service.
Here was a branded, nationwide,professionally operated subscrip-
tion model of ISP service, opening with aslarge a geographic spread as
any other contemporarynational provider. Yet, it did not end the
growth of others, such as AOL, nor did it stop new entryof small firms,
such as Mindspring, nor did it initiate atrend toward consolidation
around a few national branded ISP services. Inother words, even with
its deep pockets AT&T did not dominatethe offerings from all other
firms, nor did it end the restructuring ofthe access business. This
defied many predictions about how this marketwould be structured,
further encouraging the decentralized growthand the emergence of in-
dependent ISPs.
Growth and entry brought about extraordinaryresults. Downes and
Greenstein (1998) have constructed maps thatillustrate the density
of location of ISPs at the county level for thefall of 1996 and 1998;
black and white versions of these are shown infigures 5.1 and 5.2.
For color versions see, respectively:http://www.kellogg.nwu.edu/
faculty! greenstein/images/htm/ReSearch/MaP5/maP5ePl.pdfand
http: 1/ www.kellogg.nwu.edu / faculty /greenstein / images / htm /
Research/Maps/mapOct98.pdf.
Colored areas are countries with providers.White areas have none.
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ters, but there are also plenty of providersin rural areas. The maps also
illustrate the importance of changesover time. Many of the areas that
had no coverage in the fall of 1996were covered by the fall of 1998.
Many of the areas that had competitiveaccess markets in the early pe-
riod were extraordinarily competitivein the latter period.
Downes and Greenstein (1998) show thatmore than 92% of the U.S.
population had access bya short local phone call to seven or more ISPs
by 1998. No more than 5% didnot have any access. Almost certainly
the true percentage of the populationwithout access to a competitive
dial-up market is much lower than 5%.In other words, with the nota-
ble exception of some low-densityareas, ISP service was quickly avail-
able everywhere. To put it simply,among the vast majority of the U.S.
population in urban and suburbanareas, lack of use was primarily due
to demand factors, not the absence ofsupply.
An unexpected patternaccompanied this rapid growth ingeo-
graphic coverage. First, the number of firmsmaintaining national and
regional networks increasedover the 2 years. In 1996, most of thena-
tional firms were recognizable; theywere such firms as IBM, AT&T,
and other established firms whoentered the ISP business as a second-
ary part of their existing services, suchas providing data services to
large corporate clients. AOL, CompuServe,and Prodigy all were in the
process of converting their online service, previouslyrun more like
bulletin boards than ISPs, into Internetproviders. By 1998, many entre-
preneurial firms maintained nationalnetworks and few of thesenew
firms were recognizable toanyone other than an industry expert.
There was also a clear dichotomy forgrowth paths of entrepreneur-
ial firms who became national andregional firms. National firmsgrow
geographically by starting with majorcities across the country and
then progressively moving to cities ofsmaller populations. Firms with
a regional focus grow into geographically contiguousareas, seemingly
irrespective of urban or rural features.
Most of the coverage in ruralareas comes from local firms. In 1996,
the providers in rural countieswith under 50,000 populationwere
overwhelmingly local or regional. Only forpopulations of 50,000 or
above do national firms begin toappear. In the fall of 1998, the equiva-
lent figures were 30,000or lower, indicating that some national firms
had moved into slightly smallerareas and less dense geographic loca-
tions. In other words, Internetaccess in small rural towns is largely
done by local or regional providers,with national firms only slowlyex-
panding into similar territory.166
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It appears as if it does not payfor many large national providers to
provide dial-up service for the rural areaswhereas many small local
firms in other lines of business (e.g.,local PC retailing) can afford to
add Internet access to their existingbusiness. It may also be the case
that the local firm may have an easiertime customizing the Internet ac-
cess business to theunique needs of a set of users in arural setting.
What Structural Challenges Arose?
Commercialization of the Internetcreated an economic and business
opportunity for providing access.The costs of entry into low quality
dial-up access were low, andcommercially oriented firms filled voids
in specific places. For any firmwith national ambitions, coverage of the
top 50 to 100 cities in theU.S. was a fleeting advantage andquickly be-
come a necessity for doingbusiness. For any local or regionalfirm in an
urban market, many competitors arose.
Yet, not long after the Netscape IPOthe ISP industry began to enter a
second phase. Profitability andsurvival involved more than geo-
graphic expansion. It involved bringingISP service to the households
and businesses with PCs, butwithout access. It also involvedexpand-
ing into services which tookadvantage of new opportunitiesassoci-
ated with the web.
Understanding this second phase requires anunderstanding of the
services ISPs offer other than basic accessand how those began to
evolve. These new services include oneof several activities: monitoring
technical developments, distilling newinformation into components
that are meaningful to unfamiliar users,and matching unique user
needs to one of many new possiblesolutions enabled by advancing
technical frontiers. Sometimes itincludes heavy use of the technologi-
cal frontier and sometimes not. Ingeneral, it depends on the users,
their circumstances, theirbackground, their capital investments, the
costs of adjusting to new services,and other factors that influence the
match between user needs andtechnological possibilities.
ISPs commercialized their adaptiverole by offering new services that
can be grouped intofive broad categories: networking,hosting, web
page design, basic access,and frontier access (see theappendix of
Greenstein 1999 for precise definitions).
Networking involves activitiesassociated with enabling Internet
technology at a user's location. All ISPsdo a minimal amount of this asCommercialization of the Internet 167
part of their basic service in establishingconnectivity However, an ex-
tensive array of these services, suchas regular maintenance, assess-
ment of facilities, emergency repair, andso on, are often essential to
keeping and retaining businesscustomers. Note, as well, thatsome of
these services could have been inexistence prior to the diffusion of
Internet access.
Hosting is typically geared towarda business customer, especially
those establishing virtual retailing sites.This requires the ISP to store
and maintain information for itsaccess customers on the ISP's servers.
All ISPs do a minimal amount of hostingas part of basic service, even
for residential customers (e.g., fore-mail). However, some ISPs differ-
entiate themselves by providingan extensive array of hosting services,
including credit card processing, siteanalysis tools, and so on.
Web design may be geared towardeither the home or businessuser.
Again, many ISPs offersome passive assistance or help pageson web
page design and access. However, some offer additionalextensive con-
sulting services, design custom sites fortheir users, and provideser-
vices associated with design toolsand web developmentprograms.
Most charge fees for the additionalservices.
Basic access constitutesany service as slow as or slower thana T-1
line. Many of the technologies inheritedfrom the precommercial
days became standard parts of basicaccess and were not regarded as
a new service. A number of other new functions, suchas audio stream-
ing, filtering, and linking, alsogradually became standard parts of
most firms' offerings. Frontieraccess includes any access faster than
a T-1 line, which is becoming thenorm for business access. It also
includes ISPs that offer directaccess for resale to other ISPs or data
carriers and ISPs that offer parts of theirown backbone for resale to
others.6
By 1998, different ISPs had chosendifferent approaches, offering dis-
tinct combinations of services and distinctgeographic scopes. Table 5.1
shows the results of asurvey of the business lines of 3,816 Internet
service providers in the United States whoadvertise on thelist, an on-
line directory of ISPs, in thesummer of 1998 (see the appendix of
Greenstein 1999). Virtuallyevery firm in the sample providessome
amount of dial-up or direct access and basicfunctionality, such as
e-mail accounts, shell accounts, IFaddresses, new links, FTP, and
Telnet capabilities, but these 3,816seem to underrepresent both very










Most Common Phrases in Category Original
Sample
28.8, 56k, ISDN, web TV, wireless access,T-1, T-3,3,816
DSL, frame relay, e-mail, domain registration, (100%)
new groups, real audio, FTP,quake server, IRC,
chat, video conferencing, cybersitter TM
Networking, intranet development, WAN, 789
colocation server, network design, LAN (20.6%)
equipment, network support, network service,
disaster recovery; backup, database services,
Novell Netware, SQL server
Web hosting, secure hosting, commercial site 792
hosting, virtual FTP server, personal web space, (20.7%)
web statistics, BBS access, catalog hosting
Web consulting, active server, web design, Java, 1,385
perl, \TRML, front page, secure server, firewalls, (36.3%)
web business solutions, cybercash, shoppingcart,
Internet marketing, online marketing, electronic
billing, database integration
T-3, DSL, xDSL, 0C3, OCl2, Access rate>1056 k1,059
(27.8%)
Of the 3,816 ISPs, 2,295 (60.1%) have atleast one line of business
other than basic dial-up or directInternet access. Table 5.1 shows that
1,059 provide high speed access, 789networking, 792 web hosting, and
1,385 web page design. There is someoverlap: 1,869 do at least one of
either networking, hosting, or webdesign; 984 do only one of these
three; 105 do all three as well asfrontier access. This reveals many dif-
ferent ways to combine nonaccessservices with the access business.7
The Contours of Response to StructuralChallenges
Structural issues were not resolvedquickly and have not disappeared
as of this writing. Thisoccurred because these activities containmuch
more complexity and nuancethan table 5.1 can display.
ISPs customize Internet technologies tothe unique needs of users
and their organizations, solvingproblems as they arise, and tailoring
general solutions to idiosyncratic circumstancesand their particular
commercial strengths. Sometimes ISPscall this activity consulting, and
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practice. In either case, it involves the translationof general knowledge
about Internet technologies into specificapplications that yield eco-
nomic benefits to end users.
What factors influenced vendors'attempts to construct viable and
ongoing economic entities usingnew technology in an evolving mar-
ket place? Is it possible to classifyand analyze the determinants of
coinvention? Why did some regions play hostto ISP growth and others
did not? There are many explanations,but these aggregate into two
classes, one which emphasizes firm specificfactors and another which
emphasizes location specific factors.
Firm Specific FactorsFirm specific factors shape the incentivesto bring
new technology into use (see, e.g., Demsetz 1988or Nelson and Winter
1977 for a summary). ISPscame to the new opportunities with different
skills, experiences, or commercial focus.In the face of considerable firm
specific commercial uncertainty ISPs purchasedand installed their
own capital equipment, publicized brand andservice agreements, and
made other long-lasting investments.Many of these investments could
commit the ISP to particular services,even before market demand was
realized or new commercial opportunitieswere recognized.
Strategies pursued by national firmscan be viewed in this light.
Most national ISPs covered thesame geographic territories, so their
strategies reflected either unique assetsat the firm level, a firm's vision
for where their service should fallrelative to competitors, orsome
other firm specific feature. Amore detailed look at each of IBM, AT&T,
AOL, Earthlink/Mindspring, and PSINetwill illustrate the variety of
strategies each pursued.
IBM had been an early entrant into the ISPmarket, focusing primar-
ily on business customers andsecondarily on home users. Their service
grew rapidly nationwide and globally, complementingtheir consider-
able other computer services. Yet, ina few years the firm decided to
divest itself of its ISP backbone and facilities,eventually selling to
the highest bidder, AT&T. The firm concludedthat joint provision of
access and other computer services was nota strategic advantage,
and therefore focused its attentionon computer operations in many
firms. The full benefits from this refocusingwill only be manifest in
time.
AT&T entered into consideration inanother way. As already noted,
it added a dial-up servicesoon after commercialization. In 1998 it170
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purchased TCl/@home, a cable company,and Excite, a web portal.
These acquisitions position them forproviding data service to the
home with some content. With the recentagreement to purchase Media
One, which was pending at the FCC asof this writing, AT&T became
the largest cable provider in the country.The benefits from this are
somewhat speculative, as the revenue streamjustifying these pur-
chases has not been realized. If voicetelephony, streaming media, or
any other of the host of newbroadband services become viable over ca-
ble lines, AT&T is well positioned toprovide them. Subscription fees
for high speed access could also justifythese purchases, if that technol-
ogy becomes widelyadopted.
AOL took a different approach. First,it grew its home user base
through aggressive marketing to lesstechnical users. In response to the
proliferation of ISPs in the mid 1990s, itended its tiered subscription
model and introduced a flat-rate pricingmodel which mimics these
other ISPs. Next it bought CompuServe, afailed competitor with a
loyal customer base, and currently operatesit as a separate branded en-
tity. It also sold off its access facilitiesto UUNet, a subdivisionof
MCl/Worldcom, announcing concentration onthe development of con-
tent. It has since pursued itswalled garden strategy of making AOL
proprietary content attractive and the primaryfocus of AOL users. The
purchase of ICQ, an instant messagingservice, and Time/Warner,
among others, are consistentwith this strategic approach. It is still an
ISP, but a unique one, providing access tothe Internet that its customer
base infrequently uses. The full benefitsof this approach are specula-
tive as of this writing, as the revenuesfrom it have not been fully
realized.
Earthlink and Mindspring illustrate the issuesfacing new entrants
on a national level. Theymarket a low-cost reliable service which is
also easy to use, successfully competingagainst AT&T with much the
same appeal but adifferent branding. These firms also specializein
making the Internet easy to use forthe nonAOL user, the web surfer
who wants some but not too muchhelp. Eventually these firms
merged, partly to consolidate their resourcesfor competition against
AOL, and partly to compete morestrongly in the nonAOL customer
space. As one of the largestdial-up services in the country, there is a big
question whether they can survive intheir niche in the face of competi-
tive substitutes from all sides.
Finally, PSINet illustrates the feasibility ofembarking on a strategy
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service, but got out of that business in1996. They had built out their
own backbone, investing in high speed facilitiesacross the country fo-
cused on becoming a carrier's carrier forother ISPs and for businesses.
Part of their strategy involves heavyinvestments in complementary
services, such as hosting servicesor corporate software services, that
can offer high speed service when located nextto fast Internet back-
bone lines. They also focuson offering infrastructure services to busi-
nesses, and developing services suchas VPNs, which take advantage
of their technical capabilities andnationwide coverage. Once again, the
full benefits of this approachare speculative, depending on realizing
demand in the future.
There are, of course, many other nationalfirms. As with the above
examples, their strategies mix different elementsof speculative invest-
ment, restructuring of organizations, andentrepreneurial guesses
about future demand. In allcases, these experiments involve execu-
tives making investments under technicaland commercial uncertainty
restructuring production and distributionassets on a grand scale, try-
ing to bring new services to market,and only finding out if theymeet
market demand years after those investments.
It is also important to recognize thevariance associated with local
and regional ISPs, another and particularlyinteresting subset of ISPs,
that provide service for approximatelybetween a fifth and a quarter of
the Internet users in the U.S. These firmslocate in many different parts
of the country; hence their firm specificstrategies are also influenced
by factors associated with their locations.
Location Specific Factors A well-known lineof economic research, dat-
ing at least to Griliches (1957), has emphasizedthe geographic disper-
sion of incentives to adopt new technology.In this instance, while basic
dial-up access is widely available inall urban areas and many ruralar-
eas (Downes and Greenstejn 1998), there isgreat variance in market
structure on a local level. Someareas contain many suppliers froma
wide variety of backgrounds, while otherscontain few suppliers. From
the standpoint of an ISP, many of thesestructural features of markets
are exogenous, and shape the competitivepressures of the ISP. In addi-
tion, ISPs customize frontier technologyto the needs of enterprises do-
ing business at a specific time ina specific place. The costs of thismay
vary by region because infrastructure differs byregion. The demand
for higher speed service should also differacross regions if the users
who find speed valuableare unevenly distributed across geographic172
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regionse.g., someone from SanFrancisco may be more willing to pay
for speed than people from Poughkeepsie.
The contrast between firm specificand location specific questions are
examined in Augereau and Greenstein(1999), who looked at small
ISPs' investments in upgrades, andGreenstein (1999), who examined
small ISPs' propensity to offer servicesbeyond routine service associ-
ated with basic access. Both studiesidentify the importance of geo-
graphic factors by taking advantageof the variation between the
locations of small ISPs.
These studies are motivated by twoobservations. First, as noted in
Downes and Greenstein 1998, mostlarge firms are located in the same
(or largely overlapping) set of majorcities. Hence, for the importance
of location to be understood, the causeof variation between the small
firms needs to be identified.Second, Greenstein (1999) and Strover
(1999) document that ISPs in rurallocations tend to provide fewer high
quality services than those found inurban locations. Was this due to
differences in infrastructure betweenurban and rural areas, differences
in the type of customer foundthere, or differences in the types of entre-
preneurs who locate indifferent regions?
These studies found that firm size,capacity, and financial strength
were important determinantsof behavior. There was also someevi-
dence in Augereau and Greenstein1999 that local infrastructure qual-
ity influenced investmentbehavior. Generally, variation in local
demographic conditions or competitiveconditions did not influence
behavior. Both studies find muchunmeasured variance in behavior,
consistent with the presence ofunmeasured location specific or firm
specific determinants. Moreover, thefactors which lead ISPs to offer
new services, such assize, previous investments, andstrategic focus,
are disproportionatelyfound in national firms and in localfirms in ur-
ban areas.
These findings are consistent with theview that the scale of invest-
ment, the local infrastructure'squality, and the explicit costs shape in-
vestment decisions by young ISPsin emerging markets. It isalso
consistent with the view that there is toomuch commercial uncertainty
in this market for firms to tailorthe technical vintages of theircapital
stocks too closely to geographicallylocal demand or competitive con-
ditions. Finally, it is consistentwith the view that most young firms
with ambitious expansion plans initiallylocate in urban areas instead
of rural areas, growing their basemarkets and expanding outward, if at
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IV.Past Lessons and Future Challenges
As public discussion of electroniccommerce has grown, a loose coali-
tion of prophets for the neweconomy has come to dominate popular
discussion. They write for such publicationsas The Industry Standard,
Business 2.0, Wired, Red Herring, Fast Company, andmore Webzines than
anyone can list. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that all popular
portrayals of the Internet contain two principal features.First, the
prophets declare a business revolution in all informationintensive ac-
tivitiessuch as broadcasting, entertainment, retailmarketing, supply
chain management, other coordinative activityand research. Second,
and this is related, these same prophets proclaim thatthis technology's
novelty dilutes standard lessons from thepast. In other words, because
this technology contains so many unique features,it is ushering in a
new commercial era that operates according to new rules.
To be sure, there is probablya grain of truth to these declarations.
However, momentary euphoria does not,nor should it, justify too sim-
plistic a retrospective view of what actually happened,nor what is
about to happen. Indeed, thispaper showed that a traditional eco-
nomic perspective does provide considerable insightinto this new in-
dustry. In that spirit, we return to the questions thatmotivated the
study and recap the findings.
The Commercialization of Internet Access Technology
Why Did the Internet Access Business Grow Quickly?Stated simply, ex-
clusive use did not lead to isolated technical andoperational develop-
ments. Hence, commercializing Internetaccess did not give rise to any
difficult or insolvable technical and operationalchallenges. This was
due in no small part to theway in which the defense department and
the NSF incubated the technology. Itgrew among researchers and aca-
demics without being isolated from commercial suppliers.That is, the
technology grew without generatinga set of suppliers whose sole busi-
ness activity involved the supply of uniquely designed goods for mili-
tary or government users. Related to thiswas the fact that the basic
needs of researchers and academicswere not so different from early
commercial users. Hence, simple applications of the Internetinvented
for academic userssuch as e-mail and file transferusing phone
linesmigratedtocommercialuseswithout muchtechnical
modification.Greenstein 174
Why Did Geographic Ubiquity Arise?To summarize, the Internet access
business was commercially feasible at asmall scale and, thus, at low
levels of demand. This meant that thetechnology was commercially vi-
able at low densities of population, whether ornot it was part of a na-
tional branded service or a localgeographically concentrated service.
Again, this partly mimicked the academicexperience, where the opera-
tions were also feasible on a small scale,but that statement alone does
not capture all the factors atwork. Internet access was feasible in a
wide variety of organizational forms, large andsmall. Small scale busi-
ness opportunities thrivewith the help of entrepreneurial initiative
that tends to be widespread throughout theU.S.including many low
density and isolated cities in otherwiserural areas that were largely not
being served by national firms. Smallscale implementation also de-
pended on the presence of high quality complementarylocal infra-
structure, such as digital telephony,and interconnection to existing
communications infrastructure. These too wereavailable throughout
most of the U.S. due to national andlocal initiatives to keep the com-
munications infrastructure modern.
Why Did the Internet Access Business Not Settleinto a Common Pattern?
Market forces did not impose uniformity in the use norin the supply of
access technology Part of this wasdue to the absence of technical and
commercial challenges, which allowed low costexperimentation of the
technology in new uses, new locations, newmarket settings, new ap-
plications, and in conjunction with otherlines of business. More gener-
ally, the technology was quite malleable as aneconomic unit. It could
stand alone or become part of a wider andintegrated set of functions
under one organizational umbrella. Suchmalleability motivated exper-
iments with new organizational forms forthe delivery of access ser-
vices, experiments which continue todayFinally, and unique to this
example, the invention of the World Wide Webbrought new promise to
the technology. Not only did new businessmodels arise to explore and
develop its primitive capabilities and expandthem into new uses, but
it motivated firms to experimentwith Internet access alongside new
business lines.
Why Did Market Forces Lead to Such ExtensiveGrowth?This case illus-
trates how market forces can customize newtechnologies to users and
implement new ways of delivering technologies.These activities have
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tunities and complex issues associatedwith implementation. In addi-
tion, as the literatureon general purpose technology wouldput it,
coinvention problems are best situatedwith those who face them. In
this case, those actorswere ISPs who knew about the unique featuresof
the user, the location, or the application.More generally, commercial-
ization transferred development intoan arena where decentralized and
unregulated decision making tookover. This was precisely what was
needed to customize Internetaccess technology to a wide variety of lo-
cations, circumstances, andusers. Removing the Internet from theex-
clusive domain of NSF administratorsand employees at research
computing centers brought ina large number of potential users and
suppliers, all pursuing theirown vision and applying it to unique cir-
cumstances. In addition, it allowed private firmsto try new business
models, employing primitive webtechnologies in ways that nobodyat
the NSF could have imagined.
In What Sense Did the NSF Get Lucky?As it turned out, the NSFcom-
mercialized the Internet access industryat a propitious moment, dur-
ing the growth of anenormous new technological opportunity, the
World Wide Web. Competitive forcessorted through new uses of this
opportunity in particular places, enablingsome businesses to grow
and unsentimentally allowingunsuccessful implementations to fade.
To be sure, some of thesedevelopments were heavily shaped by
nonprofit institutions, such as the World WideWeb Consortium or the
Engineering Internet Task Force, butprofit motives still playeda prom-
inent role. Said anotherway, had NSF stewardship over the Internet
continued there would have beensome experimentation at computing
centers found at universities andgovernment laboratories, but it
would not have been possible to replicateall the exploratory activity
that did arise in commercial markets.
Disentangling the Systematic from the MerelyFortunate
While it was correct to forecast thatcommercial firms would restruc-
ture Internet access to suit commercialusers, many users did not need
such restructuring to makeuse of the technology. Internet access ob-
tained widespread commercial appealwithout restructuring ofopera-
tions and other facets of supply.As noted, this occurred formany
reasons, but two historically unique factors heavilyshaped the story.
First, the Internet wasa demonstrably viable network prior to its176
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commercialization, already used by manyresearchers, a fact that aided
its migration into commercial usethrough incremental change. Second,
the invention of the web fueledcommercial growth above and beyond
what probably would have happenedin any event. Will broad lessons
emerge in spite of theseparticular circumstances?
Said another way, while it is better tobe lucky than right, it is always
better to be both right and lucky.Would the NSF have been right if they
were unlucky? Whatif the browser had not beeninvented? Would we
still be lauding the NSF for pursuingpolicies friendly to commercial-
ization? In that spirit, this section brieflyconsiders two counterfactual
questions: (1) Would outcomes havebeen similar in the absence of
the browser? (2) Would outcomeshave been similar in the presence
of the browser, but in theabsence of NSF policies friendly to
commercialization?
The Importance of the BrowserTo answer a counterf actual question,it is
important to ask: compared withwhat alternative set of events? This is
difficult to answer in this instance becauseactual events had a certain
inevitability to them. For example,consistent with its mandate as a
public research institution, theUniversity of Illinois encouraged diffu-
sion of the browser through licensing(Cusumano and Yoffie 1998). To
be sure, the Netscape browserof 1995 was a match thrown into a dry
field, but parts of that field hadalready been set ablaze. After the Uni-
versity of Illinois began licensingMosaic it was only a matter of time
before the blaze became an inferno. Inother words, if Netscape had not
commercialized the technology somebodyelse would have done so
soon. As anotherexample, if Tim Berners-Lee hadabandoned his proj-
ect before completion, it appearsthat somebody else eventually would
have invented somethingsimilar. Tim Berners-Lee's invention of hy-
pertext (and then the WorldWide Web) culminated decades ofwork
associated with making computing easier to use,more networked and
more visual insteadof textual (Waidrop 2001).
Hence, the browser and hypertext appearto have a certain inevita-
bility to them. In that light, the mostconservative counterfactual is this:
What if hypertext and the browserhad been invented a few years later?
Would the Internet have commercializedsuccessfully?
The answer would appear to be yes,though events might not have
been as dramatic. There are several reasonsfor that assessment. First,
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of Internet access even without the browser.E-mail was among the
most popular uses for the Internet in its earlyyears, and also popular
were many of the community bulletin boards, financial applications,
news, and chat rooms. There were some substitutes for theseactivities
even without the Internet, but e-mail (especially) would havebeen
difficult to recreate in private networkson a national level and would
have compelled some commercial activity Bothhouseholds and busi-
nesses found this application useful and allsurveys of Internet use
place it as the most popular application(Clemente 1998, Nie and
Ebring 2000). While some of themore visual applications in the bulletin
board industry, such as commercialpornography and probably much
electronic retailing, would not have movedto the Internet without the
browser, surveys such as Clemente (1998) havenever shown these as
anything more than a fraction of early Internetuse.
On a business level it is also possibleto imagine considerable de-
mand for Internet access even in the absence of thebrowser. Many of
the same applications just discussed, suchas e-mail and news, moti-
vated business demand. In addition, much ofthe online database in-
dustry would have found benefit frommoving to TCP/IP based file
transfer as a substitute for bulletin board basedfile transfers that were
more cumbersome for users than a standard FTPor telnet download.
With some challenges to overcome, commercialtransactions that were
forced into EDT-based data transfers also wouldhave found TCP/IP
technology useful. However, it would have takenconsiderable time to
shift many other database applications into thismode, so one should
not underestimate the difficulties (whichwere considerable even with
the browser). So it is reasonable toexpect the growth of TCP/IP con-
nections within private industryeven without the browser, but not at
such a high rate.
Even with a later invention of the browser,many of the other institu-
tions supporting the development of the Internetalso would still have
been in place. The creation of the InternetEngineering Task Force
would have continued to havean impact on standards development
and diffusion. There might not have been anythingsimilar to the World
Wide Web Consortium, but the sharewaremovement would have con-
tinued, a factor that made it easier to obtain softwarefor setting up in-
dependent ISPs. The computing industryhad become sufficiently
vertically disintegrated by the early 1990sto prevent any single firm
from blockading diffusion of TCP/IP;8neither IBM's proprietaryGreenstein 178
networking offerings, nor DEC's, nor anyone else'scould have domi-
nated networking communications standardsthe way TCP/IP did
once it began to commercialize
Finally, even without the browser, one wouldhave expected some
migration of online capabilities intocommercial use at some level. Mi-
gration would not have been unusual byhistorical standards. New
computing capabilities often incubate amongtechnically sophisticated
users, building up functionality overlong periods of time before mi-
grating into mainstream use (Bresnahan andGreenstein 1999). In this
instance, the situation was ripe for migration.All the prototypes for
text based online activity existed amongsophisticated users. Moreover,
the new functionality associated with Internettechnologies did not re-
quire radical investments on the part of users tobe commercially via-
ble. To be sure, there was one historicalnovelty to the pattern of
migration in this instance. Due to NSF restrictions on use,the sophisti-
cated users of Internet access technology wereprimarily concentrated
in research positions and at universities, asubset of sophisticated users
in the computing industry. Aside from thisfeature, the broad pattern of
incubation and migration resembles other episodesof platform and
technological growth in computing.
This is not to take away credit from those whotook the actions and
made them happen, nor to deemphasize the importanceof these events
for firms, regions, and individuals. The contoursof events most cer-
tainly would have played out differently ifthe browser had diffused
later. It would have resulted in very differentoutcomes for particular
companies, stockholders, and, arguably, regionswhere these compa-
nies locate. Without the browser subscriptionmodel, Internet access
might have had lower adoption rates at businessesand homes, growth
might not have been as explosive, and adifferent structure of supply
might have arisen. However, it is important torecognize the broad pat-
tern that arises irrespective of the contoursof how it plays out: even
without the browser Internet technologywould have migrated into
commercial markets and demand would arise under anyscenario, mo-
tivating the industry to continue to grow to asubstantial level.
The Impor&nce of NSF PoliciesGovernment employees deliberately let
the baby bird out of the nest, encouraging itsflight. NSF's policies en-
abled the entrepreneurial initiatives of commercialfirms to influence
migration of the technology. That said, migrationof technology out of
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have happened undermany government policies. So the question
arises: Which government policieswere critical? In light of later market
events, the facet of NSF activities to highlightare those policies that did
not turn exclusive use of the Internet intoan idiosyncratic technology
during its incubation.
There were many senses in which Internettechnology was not iso-
lated during its incubation. Forexample, after the NSF created the
NSFNET in the mid 1980s therewere no attempts to exclude research-
ers who had only mild research justifications for usingthe Internet, a
policy decision that dated back to conflictsthat arose when DARPA
managed the precursor to the Internet. Thediffusion of TCP/IP in the
late 1980s further facilitated thosegoals, as it was an easy standardto
use in virtually any computing network. The NSF alsodid not isolate
the Internet from mainstreamcomputing use or vendor supply, mak-
ing contracts with firms suchas IBM and MCI for operations, effec-
tively subsidizing computing facilitiesat research facilities which did
the same. In addition, the NSF developedand subsidized growth of the
Internet at many locations, adoptinga decentralized set of regional net-
works for its operation. This structure laterfacilitated private financing
of Internet operations and further decentralizationof investment deci-
sions by organizations with commercialorientation.
It is possible to view otherevents in the late 1980s and early 1990s in
a similar light. For one, NSF contracted with thirdparties, such as
MERIT, for operations. These types ofcontracts prevented the network
technology from being distant from mainstreamengineering and tech-
nical standards. NSF permitted interconnectionwith private data com-
munication firms, such as IJUNet and PSI,a spin-off from one of the
regional networks, well before commercialdial-up ISPs came into exist-
ence. These contracts also established precedents. Finally,NSF did not
tightly police the use restriction, especiallyin the regional networks.
Indeed, a number of staff worked towarda 1992 congressional law that
officially lifted the use policyon NSFNET, providing more certainty
that commerce could be conductedusing assets that might haveap-
peared (to a court) to be previouslyowned by the federal government.
Finally, it is important to note the absenceof a particularly common
error in large infrastructure development, the attitude ofbuild it and
they will come. That is, researchers anddevelopers operating under
government subsidies tend to fulfill theirown vision of what to do
with the technology instead ofa user's. The NSF's actions effectively
prevented this attitude from overwhelmingdevelopment. As it turnedout, the immediate use ofInternet technology within academic re-
search centers tended to put things to usequicidy. It allowed research-
ers to find out whatworked and why. Hence, some userdesires
influenced system design, operation, andgrowtheven prior to the
emergence of organizationsthat have a commercial orientationand a
direct incentive to take accountof those desires.9
In summary, commercialization of governmentmanaged technology
can fail because there is noincentive to anticipate technical, commer-
cial, or structure challenges that mayarise later in commercial markets.
Since this failure can happen for a varietyof reasons, it is not possible
to point to any single NSFaction as the policy that preventedsuch a
failure or, alternatively, acted as thecatalyst for commercialization. It is,
however, accurate to say that the sumtotal of NSF's actions did not let
exclusive use by researchers impose anirreversible idiosyncratic stamp
on the Internet duringformative periods of incubation. Thesepolicies
did not generate an isolatedtechnology nor foster creation of a
nonmalleable operation around it. Instead,NSF incubated technology
with features that could adapt to thedemands of users who would
later be in the majority. This is thebroad goal worth emulating in poli-
cies for commercializing governmentmanaged technologies.
Challenges for the Near Future
The diffusion of broadband access,the widely forecast future for this
industry seems to be taking on a moretypical pattern for new technol-
ogy, where technicaland commercial constraints shape the patternof
diffusion. It is unclear what the lowest costmethod for the delivery of
broadband services will be. It is alsounclear what type of services will
motivate mass adoption of costlyhigh speed access to the home. There
are technical limitations toretrofitting old cable systems andwith de-
veloping DSL technology over longdistances. It is unclear how many
people will be willing to pay for suchhigh speed services. These uncer-
tainties cloud all forecasts. However,unlike in the past, there will not
be 2 decades of incubation ofbroadband technology by only govern-
ment sponsored researchers. Hence,there is no reason to anticipate
anything like the speed of diffusionfound in the dial-up market, nor
take for granted that ubiquity willarise as easily (for more, see, e.g.,
Weinberg 1999, or Werbach 1997).
This observation would seem, at firstblush, to suggest that this his-
tory sheds little light on thefuturethat past and future challenges are
too unique to their time forcomparison. However, that conclusion is a
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bit hasty. Looking forward in the ISPindustry, it is possible to identify
some technical, commercial, and structural challengesthat resemble
those of the past and that will alter thecontours of behavior and out-
comes. I will discuss some of these, cognizant thatrestructuring is still
taking place and changing sufficientlyfast, so that any discussionruns
the risk of becoming obsoleteas soon as it is written.
Lesson 1: The Past Does Offer Guidancefor Understanding Patterns of
RestructuringThe names of the firmsmay change and so too may the
specifics of the strategies, but the absence ofuniformity in the develop-
ment of Internet access business models shouldpersist into the future.
New applications for web technologyare still under development be-
cause the technology has potential beyond itspresent implementa-
tions. Not alllocal markets will experience thesame type of
competitive choices in access,nor should they. Not all vendors willsee
the same opportunities and these differencesarise for sound economic
reasons. Users with more experience still adoptapplications closer to
the frontier, while users with lessexperience still demand more refined
applications. Web technology enables thesedifferences to manifest in
new directions and it is not obvious whichimplementation will suc-
ceed with either type of user. In other words,most of the economic fun-
damentals leading to structural challengeshave not disappeared;
hence, experimentation withnew business models will probably
continue.
Lesson 2: The Subscription Model ofInternet Access Will Continue to
Change Commercial markets inheritedan organizational form from
their academic ancestors, modifyingit slightly for initial use. There is
no reason to presume that it will maintain thesame operational struc-
ture under competitive pressure. Indeed,it is presently under competi-
tion from a variety of alternate businessmodels which use dial-up
access to subsidize another activity. Thereare already hints of these po-
tential changes as some ISPs chargevery little for access and make up
for the lost revenue with otherservices, such as networking, hosting,or
web design. AOL has successfullycombined access with its walledgar-
den of content and AT&Tappears intent on pursuing a uniqueap-
proach of combining content andaccess. Other recent innovative firms
include Netzero.com, which is themost successful to date of many
firms that have tried to provideaccess for free and garner revenue
through sales of advertising. Thereare also many other such experi-
ments altering the explicit definition of basicservice, embedding it182
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with more than e-mail, but also with games,streaming, linking, and so
on, that has the effectof changing the pricing structure too.It is not
crazy to predict that access,by itself, could become absorbedinto a
bundle of many other complementarycommercial services, slowly fad-
ing as the standalone service thatexisted in the academic domain.
Lesson 3: The Economics of InternetDiffusion Lie Behind Much of the Digital
DivideInternet access diffused more easily to some usersand in some
locations. The margin between adoptionand nonadoption has become
popularly known as the digital divide.If some of these outcomes are
understood as temporary results of a youngdiffusion process, then
many of the differencesbetween those with virtual experienceand
those without can be framed as thebyproduct of the economic factors
shaping this diffusion episode. Withinbusiness the important factors
influencing adoption are the densityof the location of the business, the
availability of basic computer support servicesnearby, and a firm's
previous investment in IT. At thehome the important determinants are
availability (which is influenced by density) aswell as the same factors
behind the diffusion of PCs: age, education,and income especially, and
also race for some income levels. Itfollows, therefore, that policies
aimed at digital divide issues, such asthe E-rate program, should not
address those factors which are only temporaryand will resolve them-
selves through market forceswithout government intervention. In-
stead, government programs should targetfactors that are likely to be
more durable over timeand that lead to division in adoptionbehavior;
such as density of location, income, education,and race.
Lesson 4: Geographic PervasivenessIntroduces New Economic Consider-
ationsThere is one additional reason to expectthe typical business
model to remain unsettled. Geographicpervasiveness has entered into
calculations today and it was not a relevantconsideration at the outset
of commercialization. The pervasivenessof the Internet across the
country (and the developed world)changes the economic incentives to
build applications on top of the backbone,and alters the learning pro-
cess associated with itscommercial development. All ISPs nowdepend
on each other at adaily level in terms of their networksecurity, reliabil-
ity, and some dimensions ofperformance. Many new applica-
tionse.g., virtual privatenetworking, voice telephony over long
distances, multiuser conferencing, someforms of instant messaging,
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It is still unclear whether new business modelsare needed to take ad-
vantage of applications that presume geographicpervasiveness. If so,
firms with national backbones andassets will have a commercial ad-
vantage. Pervasiveness also changes the activities belowthe backbone
in the vertical chain. It has altered the scale ofthe market for supplying
goods and services to theaccess industry, altering the incentives of up-
stream suppliers, equipment manufacturers,or middleware software
providers, to bring out new services and inventivedesigns for the en-
tire network. This factor was also notpresent in the academic network
and it is unclear how it will influence thestructure of the industry
moving forward.
Lesson 5: Is There a Need for New CommunicationsPolicy for the New Mil-
lennium?Until recently, the place of technical changein most commu-
nications services was presumed to be slow andeasily monitored from
centralized administrative agencies at thestate and federal level. It is
well-known that such a presumption is dated,but it is unclear what
conceptual paradigm should replace it. Thispaper illustrated how vex-
ing the scope of the problem will be. In thisinstance, ISPs addressed a
variety of commercial and structural challengeswith little government
interference, but under considerable technicaland commercial uncer-
tainty. This occurred becausemany legacy regulatory decisions had
previously specified how commercial firmstransact with the regulated
public switch network. These legacyinstitutions acted in society's in-
terest in this instance, fostering experimentationin technically inten-
sive activities, enabling decentralized decisionmaking to shape
commercial restructuring in specific places andtime periods. To put it
simply, it was in society's interest to enhancethe variety of approaches
to new commercial opportunities and the existingset of regulations did
just that. However, going forward it isunclear whether these legacy in-
stitutions are still appropriate for other basicstaples of communica-
tions policies, such as whethera merger is in the public interest,
whether incumbent cable firms should bemandated to provide open
access, whether communications infrastructure should besubsidized
in underserved areas, and whether Internetservices should be class-
ified as a special exemption, immune fromtaxation and other fiscal ex-
penses. Hence, this industry is entering anera where market events
and unceasing restructuring will placeconsiderable tension on
long-starding legal foundations and slowregulatory rule making
procedures.Notes
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The literature on general purpose technologies(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995,
Helpman 1998) also helps frame these themes byhighlighting the role of coinvention,
defined as the complementary inventions which makeadvances in general purpose tech-
nologies valuable for particular organizations inparticular places at particular points in
time.
For example, see studies of the supersonictransport (Cohen and Noll 1990), nuclear
power (Cowan 1988), air frames (Moweryand Rosenberg 1992) and the early history of
computing (Flamm 1989, Katz and Phillips 1982), among manysuch examples.
If anything, regulatory decisions for reciprocalcompensation of competitive location
exchange providers (CLECs) encouraged CLEC entry,which also partly encouraged ISP
entry through interconnection with CLECs.Though important to incumbent local ex-
change carriers, however, one should not exaggeratethis too much. The scale of this phe-
nomenon grew tremendously in the late1990s, but ISP entry started well before then.
Moreover, since CLEC entry was primarilyconcentrated in dense urban areas, much of
this effect was felt in urban areas, whichwould have experienced a great deal of ISP en-
try even without this implicit subsidy toCLECs.
For further documentation of these methods, seeDownes and Greenstein 1999 or
Greenstein 1999. The fall 1996 data covers over 14,000phone numbers for over 3,200 ISPs.
The fall 1998 data covers over 65,000 phonenumbers for just under 6,000 ISPs.
Some ISPs have told me in interviews that thisgrowth was initially in response to cus-
tomer requests for local phone numbersfor accessing networks (e-mail mostly at first)
when these customers traveled outside their primary area.More recently, it is also com-
mon to have ISPs discuss thepossibility of developing a large customer base for pur-
poses of selling the base to a high bidderin some future industry consolidation.
Speed is the sole dimension for differentiating betweenfrontier and basic access. This
is a practical choice. There are a numberof other access technologies just now becoming
viable that are slow but technically difficult, such aswireless access. Only a small num-
ber of firms in this data offer these services andthese firms also offer high speed access.
One of the most difficult phrases to classify wasgeneral "consulting." The vast major-
ity of consulting activity is accounted for bythe present classification methods as one of
these three complementary activities, networking,hosting, and web design.
The direction of commercial events also would havecontinued to take the same direc-
tions. Important among them was the finaldissolution of the working relationship be-
tween IBM and Microsoft, as well asthe final triumph of Ethernet-based standards
within the majority of networking equipment forLAN5.
One might ask why NSF adopted these policieswhen they did and whether their con-
sequences were anticipated. That is alonger story and beyond the scope of this paper,
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which was simply to highlight those whichwere useful in light of later events. The ac-
count of Waldrop (2001), for example, begins that evaluation byarguing that NSF was
making virtue out of necessity. He argues that therewas no expectation that government
agencies could operate a large scale data network indefinitely. Thiswas particularly so at
NSF, whose budget was periodically realigned by the whimsand fads of political fash-
ion. There also was no expectation that NSF couldor would fund decades worth of large
scale data communications research on the scale that DARPAhad done. Hence, it was be-
lieved that a sustainable network would necessarilyrequire private partnership on some
level and, eventually, private financing.
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